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NOTES
CORPORATIONS
RESTRICTIONS ON THE ALIENATION OF SHARES OF STOCK
How to prevent a shareholder from selling his interest to an unwelcome
outsider has long been a problem to the founders of closely held corporations.
Shareholders of this type corporation usually operate in intimate contact with
each other, and the stock is sold not so much to raise money as to bring into
the corporation capable personnel. A new shareholder without special ability
and with only an investment. interest may be a real detriment. Interested
only in the regular payment of dividends, his dissention is likely to be disruptive of the policy of the remaining shareholders.
An attempted solution of *this problem recently came to the attention of
the Delaware courts. Tracey and Franklin, majority holders of a single class
of stock in a Delaware corporation, agreed to form a voting trust to enable
unified action in exercising the rights and. privileges of shareholders. To
strengthen this agreement, each covenanted not to sell or attempt to sell his
shares deposited with the trustees, nor assign or sell his voting trust certificates, save with the written consent of the other party. Franklin became
recalcitrant, and Tracey sued to prevent him from voting his shares in violation
of the trust agreement. The defense was illegality of the covenant in that it
constituted an unreasonable restraint on the privilege of free alienation of
property The question of legality turned upon the reasonableness of the
restraint in the light of the needs of the corporation," and the evidence failed
to show any corporate need for such a restraint. Indeed, the restraint was
found not to have been imposed for the benefit of the corporation, but rather
for the exclusive benefit of the two shareholders. Further, the operation of
the restraint prevented sale of stock during the life of the voting trust, a period
of almost ten years. o In view of the lack of corporate purpose and the
stringency of the restraint itself, the court found the restriction was neither
reasonable in operation nor necessary to the corporation. Franklin's motion
to dismiss was granted. Tracey v. Franklin, 61 A.2d 780 (Ch. Del. 1948),
aff'd, 67 A.2d 56 (Sup. Ct. Del. 1949)
Some restriction upon the alienability of corporate shares of stock is the
scheme most often utilized to exclude all except approved shareholders from
the stock lists of close corporations. These restrictions are of two general
types Those which give the corporation or the shareholders the first opportunity to buy when a sale is desired by the shareholder, hereinafter called
1. Twice before the Delaware court passed upon the legality of stock transfer restraints. Green v. Rollins & Sons, 22 Del. Ch. 394, 2 A.2d 249 (1938), Lawson v.
Household Finance Corp., 17 Del. Ch. 343, 152 Atl. 723 (1930).
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"first option" ;2 those which absolutely prohibit the sale of stock without the
consent of the remaining shareholders or the corporation, hereinafter called
"consent" restraint.3 Such restraints may be used to good advantage in every
close or family corporation and the conditions under which these restraints
may be imposed and the method of imposition are matters of importance to
the practicing attorney. This discussion will be directed to the problems of
drafting such restrictions and to their probable validity.
The first option restraint is most frequently adopted to control the
admission of new shareholders.4 Often the restraint extends the option to
both the shareholders and the corporation, thus further strengthening the
control.5 A shareholder desiring to sell stock held under this option is commonly required to offer the shares to the corporation or the shareholders at
the price at which a bona fide purchaser will buy." The agreement, however,
may call for sale at book or par value,7 and restrictions containing such
provisions have been upheld despite the opportunity of the shareholder to
sell at a higher price.8
When first option agreements were first litigated they were almost always
held invalid as an unreasonable and arbitrary restraint on alienation. 9 But
the need for some method to insure workable control in the corporation was
recognized by Mr. Justice Holmes soon after the turn of the century and his
opinion in Barret v. King,10 stressing the personal relationship of shareholders
in closely held corporations, did much to gain for these selective restraints the
2. E.g., Gibbon v. 3920 Lake Shore Drive Bldg. Corp., 310 Ill. App. 385, 34 N. E.2d
109 (1941); Touchet v. Touchet, 264 Mass. 499, 163 N. E. 184 (1928) ; State v. Sho-Me
Power Co-op., 204 S. W.2d 276 (Miss. 1947) ; Elson v. Schmidt, 140 Neb. 646, 1 N. W.2d
314 (1941); Baumohl v. Goldstein, 95 N. J. Eq. 597, 124 Atl. 118 (1924) ; Oppenheim
Collins & Co. v. Beir, 187 Misc. 428, 64 N. Y. S.2d 19. (1946).
3. E.g., Mason v. Mallard Telephone, 213 Iowa 1076, 240 N. W. 671 (1932); 68

Beacon Street v. Sohier, 289 Mass. 354, 194 N. E. 303 (1935) ; Brown v. Little, Brown
& Co., 269 Mass. 102, 168 N. E. 521 (1929) ; Penthouse Properties v. 1158 Fifth Ave.,
256 App. Div. 685, 11 N. Y. S.2d 417 (1939); Citizens Bank of Houston v. O'Leary,

140 Tex. 345, 167 S. W.2d 719 (1942).
4. A typical example of such a restriction is: "The right to assign or transfer the
common stock of the company shall be subject to the company's option of purchase from
the stockholder of record within 20 days on written notice of the desire of such shareholder to sell, assign or transfer the same." Baumohl v. Goldstein, 95 N. J. Eq. 597.
600, 124 Atl. 118, 119 (1924).
5. E.g., Stern v. Stem, 146 F.2d 870 (App. D. C. 1945) ; Vannucci v. Pedini, 217
Cal. 138, 17 P.2d 706 (1932) ; Searles v. Bar Harbor Banking & Trust Co., 128 Me. 34,
145 AtI. 391 (1929) ; Elson v. Schmidt, 140 Neb. 646, 1 N. W.2d 314 (1941).
6. Gibbon v. 3920 Lake Shore Drive Bldg. Corp., 310 Ill. App. 385, 34 N. E.2d 109
(1941); Oppenheim Collins & Co. v. Beir, 187 Misc. 428, 64 N. Y. S.2d 19 (1946).
7. E.g., Evans v. Dennis, 46 S. E.2d 122 (Ga. 1948) ; Chaffee v. Farmers Co-op.
Elevator Co., 39 N. D. 585, 168 N. W. 616 (1918).
8. Elson v. Schmidt, 140 Neb. 646, 1 N. W.2d 314 (1941).
9. Bloede v. Bloede, 84 Md. 129, 34 AtI. 1127 (1896) ; Brinkerhoff-Farris Trust &
Saving Co., 118 Mo. 447, 24 S. W. 129 (1893).
10. 181 Mass. 476, 63 N. E. 934 (1902).
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almost universal recognition which they now enjoy." Although several decisions have assumed the option restraint valid without discussion, 2 the majority
of the courts analyze the circumstances giving rise to the particular restraint
to ascertain its validity.' 3 The prime consideration is the reasonableness of
the restraint in the light of the character and need of the corporation. In
Lawson v. Household Finance Corporation14 a first option accompanying a
voting agreement contract was held valid since its purpose was to aid in assuring good management and effective control in a closely held corporation, the
success of which was dependent upon the ability of the shareholders. Such
restrictive agreements are well adapted to insure smooth control in close
corporations2 5
The consent restraint requires the shareholders desiring to sell to secure
the approval of the remaining shareholders or the board of directors. This
restriction is employed to meet a different situation than that which occasions
the use of the first option. For example, the corporate founders might want
to exclude outsiders and at the same time avoid tying up corporate funds in
the purchase of treasury shares, as might be necessary under*the option restraint. By requiring consent to be secured before a sale, the restriction
compels the original shareholder to fulfill his obligation to the corporation
until a suitable replacement can be found. 6
In regard to consent restraints, the decision in the Tracey case is in accord
with the law as it was understood and applied shortly after the turn of the
century. Until 1914, almost without exception, the courts held that any
restraint conditioning the ability of the owner to sell his stock upon the consent
11. Thus, the following passage from the Barrett case, quoted in Serota v. Serota,
168 Misc. 27, 30, 5 N. Y. S.2d. 68, 71 (1938), was relied upon in holding valid an option
agreement: ".

.

. stock in a corporation is not merely property.

It creates a personal

relationship analogous otherwise than technically to a partnership . . . there seems to
be no greater objection to retaining the right to choose one's associates in a corporation
than in a firm."
12. Monotype Composition v. Kiernan, 319 Mass. 456, 66 N. E.2d 565 (1946);
Touchet v. Touchet, 264 Mass. 499, 163 N. E. 184 (1928).
13. Lawson v. Household Finance Corp., 17 Del. Ch. 343, 152 Atl. 723 (1930); Gibbon
v. 3920 Lake Shore Drive Bldg. Corp., 310 I1. App. 385, 34 N. E.2d 109 (1941); Doss v.
Yingling, 95 Ind. App. 494, 172 N. E. 801 (1932) ; Chaffee v. Farmers Co-op. Elevator
Co., 39 N. D. 585, 168 N. W. 616 (1918).
14. 17 Del. Ch. 343, 152 Atl. 723 (1930).
15. Conversely, where an open corporation is involved, the shareholders themselves
usually have little control; stock is bought for investment purposes, and the only protection the owner has when the corporation is operated in a manner he deems to be
adverse to this interest is to sell out. In this situation there would be little reason to hold
valid any restraint that tended to prevent a ready sale at the most advantageous price.
Few cases have been found involving restrictions employed by open corporations, probably
because such controls are generally unnecessary. See Ireland v. Globe Milling Co., 21
R. I. 9, 41 AtI. 258 (1898) passim.
16. This feature makes the restraint useful to co-operative organizations. E.g., 68
Beacon Street v. Sohier, 289 Mass. 354, 194 N. E. 303 (1935) ; Penthouse Properties v.
1158 Fifth Ave., 256 App. Div. 685, 11 N. Y. S.2d 417 (1939).
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of some other person was invalid as against public policy. Thus, in In Re
Petition of Klaus,17 shareholders attempting to invoke such a restraint against
a fellow shareholder were unsuccessful though the corporation was composed
of only a few members and the shareholder who sought to sell had voted to
create this restriction in the by-laws. The Massachusetts case of Longyear v.
Hardman,8 decided in 1914, was one of the first instances of judicial approval
of this type of restraint. Since then there has arisen an impressive line of
cases upholding the subjection of the privilege to sell to the approval of the
remaining shareholders or the corporation. 9 In all of these cases special
circumstances have made it necessary that the directors and shareholders be
able to act together in harmony. The corporation has been a small closely
held concern engaged in a limited or special kind of activity. 68 Beacon
Street v. Sohier" is typical of one group of cases in which the restraint
was found necessary and reasonable. 68 Beacon Street was a corporation
organized to operate an expensive and highly exclusive apartment building.
The shareholders were tenants holding long term leases to various apartments
in the building. To insure that a prospective new tenant, who was also
required to be a shareholder, would not detract from the value of the property,
the restriction reserved in the directors the right to approve or disapprove of
the financial status and character of all possible purchasers. This was held
to be a reasonable restraint by the court. Similarly, corporations engaged in
the publication of a foreign language newspaper, 2' in the operation of a small
town telephone exchange,2 2 and in the carrying on of a family operated salvage
business 23 have all been successful in the enforcement of restrictions involving
consent to a sale.
In deciding which of the two types of restraints, consent or first option,
is to be used in the individual case, consideration should be given to the requirements of the corporation and the probable validity of the chosen restraint
in the particular jurisdiction. The first option type is the more easily defended
against attacks of unreasonableness and, in most instances, will serve to give
the shareholders the degree of protection they desire. While there is an
apparent trend toward more general recognition of the consent restraint;
nevertheless, its validity in some jurisdictions is questionable. Many courts
17. 67 Wis. 401, 29 N. W. 582 (1886).
18. 219 Mass. 405, 106 N. E. 1012 (1914).
19. People v. Galakis, 233 Ill. App. 414 (1924) ; Mason v. Mallard Telephone Co.,
213 Iowa 1076, 240 N. W. 671 (1932) ; 68 Beacon Street v. Sohier, 289 Mass. 354, 194
N. E. 503 (1935) ; Brown v. Little, Brown & Co., 269 Mass. 102, 168 N. E. 521 (1929) ;
Penthouse Properties v. 1158 Fifth Ave., 256 App. Div. 685, 11 N. Y. S.2d 417 (1939).

20. 289 Mass. 354, 194 N. E. 303 (1935).
21. People v. Galakis, 233 Ill. App. 414 (1924).
22. Mason v. Mallard Telephone Co., 213 Iowa 1067, 240 N. W. 671 (1932).

23. Oakland Scavenger Co. v. Gandi, 51 Cal, App.2d 69, 124 P.2d 143 (1942).
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still regard shares of stock as just another class of personal property and
believe public policy demands their free flow in the stream of commerce.
From the decided cases, bits of information can be gleaned which, when
assembled, give valuable aid in drafting restrictive agreements of both types.
On general corporation principles, a provision in the articles of incorporation
is held binding as a contract to which each shareholder is a party.24 Thus, any
restraint upon alienation should be drafted in the articles when the corporation
is formed. 25 In additioi, since the courts lay major stress on reasonableness
in upholding the restraint, it is advisable to detail the corporate interests requiring the application of the restraint. Where the restraint is adopted after
incorporation, it would be advisable to amend the articles to include the
provision.
In addition to writing the sale restriction in the articles, a by-law should
be adopted augmenting them. 26 Courts that have found a provision in the
articles invalid for lack of statutory authority have upheld the restraint as a
binding contract between the corporation and the shareholders, or between
24. "Ever since the decision in the Dartmzouth College Case . . . it has been generally recognized in this country that the charter of a corporation is a contract between . . . the corporation and its shareholders. It is not necessary to cite authorities
to support this proposition." Lawson v. Household Finance Corp., 17 Del. Ch. 343, 349,
152 Atl. 723, 727 (1930).
25. Inclusion in the articles is apparently not required in Indiana, in view of section
6(g) of the Indiana Corporation for Profits Act, IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns 1933) § 25-206,
which provides that the transfer of stock may be regulated by appropriate provisions in
the by-laws. However, good corporate practice mandates this inclusion. An example
of such an article provision follows:
No transfer of stock shall be valid, until ten days after the company,
through its secretary, shall have written notice of the proposed sale,
the price at which the proposed sale is to be made, and the name of the
prospective buyer; and during said ten days, the company shall have the
sole option to buy the said shares at the price named in the notice.
26. There has been little litigation in Indiana on the validity of restraints on the
alienation of shares of stock. In Doss v. Yingling, 95 Ind. App. 494, 172 N. E. 801 (1932),
a first option restraint imposed in the by-laws was held binding upon the shareholders.
The court refused to pass upon the legality of the by-law, but ruled that in any event the
agreement would be binding as a contract, evidenced by the by-laws. A typical by-law
provision for a restraint reads as follows:
If any stockholder desires to sell his stock in such company, the
remaining stockholders of such company shall have the first right to
purchase the same in the proportions of their present holdings in such
company, and the price to be paid for such seller's stock shall be the
value of the same as shown by the books of the company at the time of
the proposed sale. Such retiring or selling stockholders shall give
the other stockholders notice in writing of his intention to sell his
stock, and such remaining stockholders shall have ten (10) days from
the receipt of such notice within which to purchase such stock at its
book value; but if they, or any of them, do not exercise the right to
purchase then such selling stockholder is at liberty to sell such stock
to third persons. If any stockholder does not desire to avail himself
of the privilege to purchase such stock as herein provided, then the
other stockholders may exercise such privilege in the proportions of
their present holdings.
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the shareholders themselves, where it also appeared in the by-laws. 27 Thus, it
was said in Searles v. Bar HarborBanking and Trust Co., 23 ". . . we think
that the tendency of the more recent decisions . . . is to sustain such restrictions if reasonable and the stock has been accepted following the adoption of
the restriction .

.

. whether valid as a by-law or not on the ground that it

constitutes a valid agreement between the shareholders and the corporation."
The quotation suggests that, as to those shareholders acquiring shares before
the restrictive agreement was adopted, the restraint would not be binding. The
same would seem true as to those holders who did not vote to adopt the by-law.
In either situation, to apply the restraint to the dissenter would result in
changing the contractual rights, acquired by the shareholder under the terms
of the original purchase agreement. However, it is possible that these contract
rights could be validly changed by an amendment to the articles. Such
amendments, when passed by the required vote, generally are binding upon
all shareholders, whether they voted for or against them.209
If a restraint is imposed neither by the articles nor the by-laws, but by
a private contract between the shareholders, it may still be binding. The
danger in the private contract method lies in the difficulty of proving the
restraint reasonable, for where the restraint is not imposed by the corporation
the inference is that the corporate organizers did not consider such a restraint
necessary. However, if substantial need for the restraint can be shown the
0
private contract is likely to be as binding as a by-law or article provision.
The Uniform Stock Transfer Act2 ' requires notice of any provision
affecting the free alienation of shares of stock to be printed on the stock
certificate if it is to control subsequent sales by the shareholders. Whether
or not the jurisdiction in which the business is incorporated has adopted the
Uniform Stock Transfer Act or a similar provision, it is advisable to have
such notice printed on the certificate, rather than rely on the implied notice
to purchasers that arises from the articles and by-laws.
Some consideration should be given to the duration of the restraint. The
problem applies particularly to the consent restraint. Here, if the corporation
withholds consent to sell, the shareholder would be prevented forever from
27. See Doss v. Yingling, 95 Ind. App. 496, 501, 172 N. E. 801, 803 (1932) ; Krauss v.
Kuechler, 300 Mass. 346, 349, 15 N. E.2d 207, 209 (1938).
28. 128 Me. 34, 39, 145 AtI. 391, 393 (1929).
29. Section 28 of the Indiana Corporation for Profit Act; IND. STAT. ANN. (Burns
1933) § 25-227 provides that an amendment shall not affect ". . . the existing rights of
persons other than shareholders.. . ." By implication, the statute does permit the rights
of a shareholder to be changed by an amendment. (Italics added). See Mason v. Mallard
Telephone Co., 213 Iowa 1076, 1080, 240 N. W. 671 673 (1932).
30. Model Clothing House v. Dickinson, 146 Minn. 367, 178 N. W. 957 (1920);
Oppenheim Collins & Co. v. Beir, 187 Misc. 428, 64 N. Y. S.2d 19 (1946).
31. Section 15. This provision has been adopted in IndianaN. i
TT
A
A iV
(Burns 1933) § 25-715.
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disposing of his stock; whereas stock held subject to the first option may be
sold at the expiration of the period during which the corporation has the
privilege to buy. The fact that duration is usually unlimited seldom appears
to influence the courts final decision. The Tracey case is one of the few
instances where the court considered this factor, and yet here the implication
was strong that had there been a showing of corporate need the restraint
would have been valid.3 2 In general, it may be said that the needs of the
corporation should control the duration. For example, if the restraint is
imposed to preserve the family character of a corporation, it must retain its
force so long as that character remains unchanged. In drafting, therefore, it
should be specified that the restraint will be applicable so long as the corporation retains its original character.
What has been said above applies both to the first option and consent
restraints. There remain to be considered two factors which have application
exclusively to the first option.
In exercising the granted option the corporation acquires the shares from
the holder; thus, it is imperative that the provision establishing the option
provide for the fixing of a purchase price. Probably the most suitable method
of determining this price is by the valuation of an arbitration committee, one
member of which is appointed by the corporation, one by the shareholder, and
these two to select an impartial third member. This enables the shareholder
to secure a more adequate return over book value, and at the same time
reserves to the corporation some voice in the fixing of the price. For the
shareholder who can find no willing buyer, such a valuation is necessary
since the stock of small corporations is not listed on the exchanges and there
is no readily ascertainable market value.
A well drafted first option agreement should contain a definite statement
of the period during which the corporation has the option to buy after receiving notice of the desire to sell. Although it is probable no restriction has been
struck down because of the absence of this condition, the inclusion of it will
prevent disputes between the parties as to when the shareholder is free to sell
to an outsider. There must be time for the directors to meet, to determine
whether or not to exercise the option, and to procure the necessary funds to
purchase the shares. The latter may be no small problem to the typical closely
held corporation. The legality of the duration of the option period itself has
never been litigated. In one case, however, a restraint involving an option of
32. See 67 A.2d 56, 59-60 (Sup. Ct: Del. 1949),
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ninety days33 was held valid, and numerous options of from thirty to sixty
days34 have been upheld.
Restraints of the types discussed can be extremely useful to the small
corporation, and careful consideration should be given to the advisability of
their inclusion as part of the agreement between the shareholders and between
the shareholders and the corporation. The first option restraint, when properly
imposed, is almost certain to be upheld by the courts as against attacks of
unreasonable restraint on alienation. The degree of certainty is less for the
consent restraint, but the utility of it in special circumstances would seem to
warrant the risk.
33. Chaffee v. Farmers Co-op Elevator Co., 39 N. D. 585, 168 N. W. 616 (1918).
34. Model Clothing House v. Dickinson, 146 Minn. 367, 178 N. W. 957 (1920) ; State
v. Sho-Me Power Co-op., 204 S. W.2d 276 (Miss. 1947) ; Serota v. Serota, 168 Misc. 27,
5 N. Y. S.2d 68 (1938); Nicholson v. Franklin Brewing Co., 82 Ohio St. 94, 91 N. E.
991 (1910) ; Rychwalski v. Milwaukee Candy Co., 205 Wis. 193, 236 N. W. 131 (1931).

